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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HERMES ASSOCIATES, a

:

Utah corporation
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900299-CA

vs.
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

:
:

Oral Argument Priority
No. 16

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

upon the Utah

Court of Appeals

is

pursuant to an Order of the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
IN TRIAL COURT
This is a civil action arising out of a breach of a
Lease

Cancellation

Agreement

between

plaintiff-Appellee,

HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah Partnership, (hereinafter generally
referred

to as

"Hermes"),

and defendant-Appellant,

PARK'S

SPORTSMAN, a Utah Corporation (hereinafter generally referred
to as "Park's").
The trial court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
presiding, after a bench trial, entered its findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and awarded judgment in favor of Hermes
and against Park's.
Park's Sportsman appeals from and seeks reversal of
that final judgment of the trial Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review to the
Court of Appeals.
1.

Did the execution and delivery of the Lease

Cancellation Agreement

constitute novation of the Hermes-

Park's Lease ?
2.

Did plaintiff breach the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, in its dealings with defendant ?
3.

Did Park's Sportsman become a surety for the

obligations of Gart Bros ?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This is a civil case which involves the review of

the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial
court, based upon the trial

in this matter, in order to

determine whether or not there are sufficient evidence in the
record to sustain the findings of the trial Court.
The issues in this case relate to the legal meaning
of the Lease Cancellation Agreement.

2

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT.
After

the

filing

of

the

complaint

and

the

appropriate responsive pleadings by defendant, the parties
engaged in discovery.

At the conclusion of the discovery

phase of the litigation, a trial was had before the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge presiding, without a jury.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant
offered no witness and no other evidence on the merits of the
case, except a proffer (through defendant's counsel) of proof
relating

to

attorney's

fees

and certain

exhibits

related

thereto.
After argument by both counsel the Court made and
entered its findings in open court.
Thereafter written findings of facts and conclusions
of

law were

submitted

to the Court; after a hearing

and

disposition of defendant's objections, final findings of fact
and conclusions of law and a judgment thereupon was signed by
the trial Court on February 28, 1990.
Notice of the Judgment

so entered was given to

defendant on February 28, 1990.
It is from the final Judgment entered on February
28, 1990, that defendant appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff,

Hermes

Associates,

is

a

Utah

Partnership, owner and operator of a shopping center project
3

known as the Family Center at Midvalley, located in Salt Lake
County, Utah; (Tr. p. 16).
2.

Defendant, Park's Sportsman, Inc., is a Utah

corporation, which by and through Russell Park and Randy Park,
negotiated

a lease with plaintiff, and became

Tenant at the Family Center at Midvalley;

plaintiff's

(Tr. p. 17, Exhibit

6)
3.

On or about May 20, 1982, Hermes as Landlord,

and Park's as Tenant, entered into a lease agreement (the
"Park's Lease") for 13,500 square feet of retail commercial
space

located

at

Hermes'

shopping

center,

known

as

the

Midvalley Family Center, at 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake
County, Utah; (Tr. 17, lines 13-16; Exhibit 6 ) .
4.

Defendant Park's entered into possession of the

leased premises and operated its retail sporting goods store
until sometime in April 2nd or 7th of 1987.
5.
and

Randy

Defendant Park's, by and through Russell Park

Park,

negotiated

a

termination

plaintiff, terminating Park's tenancy;

agreement

with

(Tr. p. 17, line 17,

through p. 18, line 3 ) .
6.

On April 2nd, 1987, Hermes and Park's entered

into a Lease Cancellation Agreement, canceling the Park's
Lease;

(Tr. p. 19; Exhibit 1 ) .
7.

Park's sold its retail sporting good business

located at the Hermes' Midvalley Shopping Center to Gart Bros
4

on or about April 2nd or 7th, 1987.
8.

The

Lease

Cancellation

Agreement

obligated

Park's to commence on May 1, 1987, and continue for sixty (60)
months, the payment of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars for
each and every month; (Exhibit 1 ) .
9.

The

Lease

Cancellation

Agreement

became

effective as of the effective date upon which Hermes would
have entered into a lease agreement with Gart Bros;

(Exhibit

1)
10.

The effective date of a lease between Hermes

and Gart Bros, (the "Gart Lease") was the 7th day of April,
1987; (Exhibit 7 ) .
11.

The obligation of Park's to pay the $ 1,000.00

per month was to continue until Gart Bros made to Hermes a
percentage rent payment in any twelve (12) month period of a
sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars, under the
Gart Lease; (Exhibit 1 ) .
12.

Park's commenced the monthly payments pursuant

to the Lease Cancellation Agreement

and made eleven

(11)

payments thereunder amounting to the sum of $ 11,000.00.
13.

Park's did not pay the monthly payment due on

April 1, 1988, and no other payment thereafter; (Tr. p.24,
lines 3-10).
14.

As of the date of the trial Park's has not made

twenty two (22) required monthly payments, amounting to the
5

sum of Twenty Two Thousand ($ 22,000.00) Dollars; (Tr. p. 33,
lines 11-15).
15.

It was not intended by Hermes that Park's be

excused from performance (i.e., the payment of $ 1,000.00 per
month) on October 1, 1987, or January 1, 1988, or April 1,
1988.
16.

It

was

not

intended

by

Hermes

that

any

subsequent (to April 2, 1987) agreement(s) between Hermes and
Gart Bros (to which subsequent agreement(s) Park's was not a
party) be or deemed to be a novation of the Lease Cancellation
Agreement.
17. It was not intended by any party that Park's
would be a surety or a guarantor of the Gart Lease, or the
obligations thereunder; (Tr. p. 37, lines 7-10).
18.

Plaintiff did not ask Park's to guarantee the

Gart Bros lease; (Tr. p. 37, lines 4-6).
19.

Gart Bros did not request plaintiff to have

Park's guarantee the gart Bros lease; (Tr. p. 37, lines 1113).
20.

Plaintiff did not demand that Park's pay for

the Gart Bros lease rental payments; (Tr. p. 37, lines 19,
21).
21.

It was not intended by any party that Gart Bros

would assume the obligations of Park's under the Park's Lease,
or under the Lease Cancellation Agreement.
6

22.

There

was

no

shortfall

under

the

Lease

Cancellation Agreement attributable to the Park's Lease, which
was required to be paid by Gart Bros.
23.

During the first year, or the second year, or

the year ending with December 1989, of the Gart Lease, Gart
Bros did not achieve gross sales in sufficient amounts so as
to obligate Gart Bros to pay to Hermes percentage rents in
excess of $ 10,000.00. (Tr. p. 36, lines 13-22, Exhibit 2 and
Exhibit 3 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is only one way that Park's can be excused
from

paying

the

monthly

Cancellation Agreement

$

1,000

to

Hermes;

the

clearly, on its face, on the

Lease
four

corners of the document, states that when and if Gart Bros
makes a percentage rent payment to Hermes, in any twelve month
period, of a sum in excess of $10,000.00, then and in that
event, Hermes will cancel the obligation of Park f s to continue
making the monthly $ 1,000 payments.
Gart Bros did not pay any excess percentage rent
payment during the pertinent period of this lawsuit.
The defense of novation is not applicable to the
facts and the law of this case.
Also, the defense of breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is not applicable to the facts
and the law of this case;

assuming arguendo that the defense
7

was applicable, defendant has waived the said defense at the
time of trial and can not raise it on appeal for the

first

time.
The judgment of the trial court must be affirmed in
all of its particulars, and defendant should be awarded its
cots and attorney's fees on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AMENDMENT
TO THE GART BROS LEASE
DID NOT CONSTITUTE NOVATION
OF THE PARK'S OBLIGATION
UNDER THE
LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT
Defendant contends that when plaintiff entered into
a modification agreement with Gart Bros, on or about October
1987, for leasing additional space to Gart Bros, that the
modification agreement constituted novation, thus relieving
defendant from the obligation to continue the monthly payments
pursuant to the Lease Cancellation Agreement.
In asserting the foregoing position defendant fails
to point to any evidence in the record supporting such a
baseless assertion.

Defendant did not produce any evidence,

by virtue of any testimony by an officer of the defendant
corporation,

nor

did

defendant

offered

any

documentary

evidence supporting its novation theory.
Appellant appears to challenge the correctness of

8

the trial Court f s finding that no novation occurred when the
Gart Bros Amendment was entered into between plaintiff and
Gart Bros.
In order for defendant to mount a successful assault
to the correctness of a trial court's finding the defendant,
must first assemble all the evidence supporting the finding,
and then demonstrate to the Appellate Court that the evidence
is legally insufficient to support the finding even in viewing
it in the light most favorable to the court below.
Estate

of

Bartell,

776

P.2d

154

Mitchell, 767 P.2d 817 (Utah 1989);
P.2d

1068,

1070

(Utah

1985).

(Utah

1989);

In re

State

v.

Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700
Defendant

has

failed

to

demonstrate, in its brief, that the trial court committed
reversible error.
Attempting to bootstrap its theories of "novation",
or "breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing", defendant asserts in its brief, on pages 12-13 that
"Park's was not aware of the terms of the Gart Lease at the
time

the

Lease

Cancellation

Agreement

was

executed,

but

assumed that the Gart lease would be similar to the Park's
lease

. . . ".

testimony

There is no evidence either in the form of

by an officer of defendant, or in the form of

documentary evidence, which would allow defendant to make such
assumptions.

One of the persons who could have testified as

to what the Park's assumptions were, was the president of the
9

defendant, Russell Park, who while present at the trial, did
not

take

the witness

defendant.

stand

to testify

on

behalf

of

the

After all, he was a party to the preparation and

execution of the Lease Cancellation Agreement, and privy to
the

conversations

between plaintiff

(J. Rees

Jensen) and

Russell and Randy Park. (Tr. p. 17, line 20 through p. 18,
line 3)
Plaintiff

readily

admits

that

the

law

in

this

jurisdiction recognizes the implied covenant of good faith and
fair

dealing

"Covenant").

(hereinafter

sometimes

referred

to

as

the

Nevertheless, defendant has failed to prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that the duty owed to the
defendant was ever breached.

Additionally, the allegation of

the breach of the Covenant is an affirmative defense, which
must be plead

(Rule 8(c), Utah R. Civ. P.) at the time a

responsive pleading, to the complaint, by defendant is filed.
The

foregoing

affirmative

was

not

plead

in

defendant's answer to plaintiff's complaint (Index pp. 0000800010).

Furthermore, the said affirmative defense was not

presented at the trial Court, at the time of the trial, either
in the form of evidence presentation or argument.
having

failed

to

properly

assert

and

thus

Defendant,

preserve

the

affirmative defense of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, has waived (Rule 12(h), Utah R. Civ. P.)) the
assertion of the same, and can not now for the first time
10

raise the issue on appeal.
The standard of review for an appellate court is
that of a "clearly erroneous" standard, which standard is
applied in all cases, whether they arise in equity or at law.
See Barker v. Francis, 741 P. 2d 548, 551 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
The action against Park's in the trial court was
based upon the document known as the
Agreement", Exhibit 1.

"Lease

Cancellation

The terms of that document, relating

to Park's obligations toward its former landlord are very
similar and are akin to those of a promissory note.

The

document contains a contractual obligation of the defendant to
make monthly payments of $ 1,000.00,

in consideration of

defendant's release from the lease obligations (the obligation
to make monthly lease payments, and the pro-rata payment of
real

estate

taxes,

insurance,

common

expenses, etc.) of the Park's Lease

area

maintenance

(Exhibit

6 ) , and the

forgiveness of a promissory note due to Hermes.
Paragraph 2 of Exhibit 1 states the obligations of
defendant in clear, concise and totally unambiguous language.
Paragraph 3 of Exhibit 1 states certain conditions
which would:

a)

either excuse defendant from paying the $

1,000.00 per month; and/or b)

entitle defendant to a rebate.

The evidence is clear and unequivocal; none of the
conditions allowing defendant not to continue to pay, have
11

been met, nor can they be implied.
Defendant by asserting the defense of novation seeks
to exculpate itself from the obligation to make the monthly
payments

in

accordance

with

the

tenor

of

the

Lease

Cancellation Agreement.
It

is

evident

that

defendant

misapplies the principle of novation.

misconstrues

and

Plaintiff's cause of

action was not predicated upon the obligations of the Park's
Lease; plaintiff's cause of action is based upon the Lease
Cancellation Agreement

and the pleadings reflect the same

accordingly.

There is no other subsequent "agreement" which

modifies

the

Lease

evidence

in

the

Cancellation

record

and

Agreement.

defendant

There

points

to

is

no

none,

evidencing the intent of plaintiff to change the terms of the
Lease Cancellation Agreement, by entering into the Gart Bros
Amendment.
Defendant's

theory

of

novation

was

similarly

asserted and summarily rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in
First American Commerce Company v. Washington Mutual Savings
Bank, 743 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1987) wherein the Court stated:
Lender
insists
that whether
a novation
occurred is a matter of law, not of fact. Lender
asserts that the language of the loan documents
clearly described a novation.
We disagree with
Lender on both assertions. Whether an agreement is
a novation is a matter of intent.
The essential
element of a novation is the discharge of one of
the parties to a contract and the acceptance of a
new performer by the other party as a substitute
12

for the first original party.
See Kennedy v.
Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 187, 95 P.2d 752 (1939). A
novation must be intended by the parties to the
original contract.
[T]he burden of proof as to a
novation by the transaction in
question rests upon the party who
asserts it; ... an intention to
effect a novation will not be
presumed; ... in the absence of
evidence
indicating
a
contrary
intention, it will be presumed,
prima facie, that the new obligation
was accepted merely as additional or
collateral
security,
or
conditionally,
subject
to
the
payment
thereof;
and
that
the
intention to effect a novation must
be clearly shown.
As defendant has the burden of proof to prove the
basic elements of novation, defendant has not produced any
testimony nor other documentary evidence showing that the
parties

intended

that

defendant

be

discharged

from

its

obligations, under the Lease Cancellation Agreement, to make
the required monthly payments.
Again in rejecting novation as a defense in Horman
v. Gordon,

740 P. 2d 1346 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) the Utah Court

of Appeals set forth the elements of novation as follows:
"... For a novation to occur, there
must be (1) an existing and valid
contract, (2) an agreement to the new
contract by all parties, (3) a new valid
contract, and (4) an extinguishment of
the old contract by the new one ...
(citations omitted); _Id., p. 1352.
In applying the foregoing elements of novation to
13

the facts of the instant case we see that the facts do not fit
into the elements of the defense of novation:
Element 1, "an existing and valid contract" is the
Lease Cancellation Agreement.
Element 2, "An agreement to the new contract by all
parties" - there is no "new" contract which has been agreed to
by all parties; the Gart Bros Amendment is a contract between
plaintiff and Gart Bros only, and it was not required that
defendant should evidence its assent.
Element 3, "a new valid contract" - there is no "new
valid" contract, between plaintiff and defendant; only an
amendment to the Gart Bros Lease executed some six (6) months
after the Lease Cancellation Agreement.
Element 4, "an extinguishment of the old contract by
the new one" - there is not a scintilla of evidence of intent
(by plaintiff) of forgiveness, extinguishment, or exculpation,
and defendant having the burden of proof can not point to the
record for any such or similar evidence which might have been
presented to the trial court.
It is important to note that the Lease Cancellation
Agreement between Hermes and Parks was not in any way, shape,
or form, changed, nor was it altered, nor modified.

Hermes at

all times dealt with Parks strictly in accordance with the
terms of the Lease Cancellation Agreement; additionally, Parks
dealt with Hermes (until and including March 1, 1988) strictly
14

in

accordance

with

the

terms

of

the

Lease

Cancellation

Agreement.
Defendant in the instant case has failed in its
burden of proof to show that novation occurred;
evidence, in either documentary or testimonial

no clear
form, were

presented to the Court evidencing the intent of the parties to
have and to be bound by novation.
The condition precedent, to Park's not having the
obligation to make the monthly payment, (to-wit, payment by
Gart Brothers of the percentage rents in excess of $ 10,000),
had not occurred, as of the time of the trial.
evidence

demonstrates

that

plaintiff

Plaintiff's

calculated

as

the

triggering mechanism for the payment of percentage rents by
Gart Bros, to be the sum of $ 1,800,000.00 (Tr. p 55, lines
11-20; p. 60, lines 2-4) sales' volume, regardless of the
number of square footage occupied by and/or leased by Gart
Bros (Tr. p. 62, lines 11-18).

Mr. Holmberg testified as

follows:
Q. ... Now Mr. Holmberg, you made the calculations
to make a determination to see whether or not
percentage rent, excess percentage rent was paid in
excess of $10,000 by Gart bros, in order to
determine whether or not ... Parks had a continuing
obligation to pay the thousand dollars. Is that
correct ?
A

That is correct.

Q. What sales did you take into account for
the Gart Bros Lease ?
15

A. We used all of the sales reported to us by
Gart Bros.
Q.

And you set it off against what standard ?

A.
We used the total sales reported to us,
and the break point would be $ 1.8 million dollars
as provided in the original documents.
Q.
That part of the agreement on the Lease
Cancellation Agreement did not ever change with
Parks brothers (sic), did it ?
A. No. We calculated it in the same way before
and after. It had not changed.
Q.
Okay.
Based on those calculations, did
..„ Hermes Associates receive $10,000 as percentage
rents ?
A. They did not.
(Tr. p. 66, line 11 through p. 67, line 10)
In cross-examination by defendant's counsel, Mr,
Holmberg also testified as follows (Tr. p. 68, lines 9-14):
Q.
And did you do that [calculating the
excess percentage rents] on the basis of square
footage ?
A.

It's done on the basis of the total sales.

Q.
For both premises or just the original
premises ?
A.

The total sales given to us by Gart Bros

Upon

further

cross-examination

Mr.

Holmberg

testified as follows (Tr. p. 68, line 23-25; p. 69, line 1-7):
Q.
The question is, did you calculate the
sales on a square footage basis ?
A. No.
16

Q.
Did you include - when Gart Bros, took
over and increased their spice [sic] (read space)
by 54 percent, did that increase the amount of
rental they had to pay before they got into
percentage rental payment ?
A. When they moved into the new space, their
rent increased.
However, the break point for
calculating percentage rent did not change.
In his entire testimony Mr. Holmberg testified that
the break point for calculating the percentage rent due was
based upon the figure of $ 1,800,000.00, and the total figure
of total sales was taken into account, regardless whether the
sales came from the space originally leased by Gart Bros, or
as the space was enlarged by the amendment of the Gart Bros
lease. (Tr. p. 69, line 8 through p. 70, line 15). See also
the

testimony

of Mr. Holmberg

calculation contained

relating

to the method

of

in the transcript page 75, line 15

through page 76, line 3.
Defendant additionally asserts as a secondary issue
that Parks, in the absence of any written agreement, and by
operation of law, became a surety or a guarantor of the Gart
Lease obligations.
In

support

of

that

contention

defendant

cites

several cases, which upon close examination are clearly and
factually distinguishable from the facts of the case at bar.
For defendant to be able to prevail it would have to come
within

the

ambit

of

the

Horman

v.

Gordon

case,

supra.

Defendant's version of the facts, as much as defendant wishes,
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do not come within the purview of that case because for the
principal as enunciated in Horman to apply, Gart Bros must
have assumed the Lease Cancellation Agreement and not the
obligations of the lease, which in any event were not assumed
by

Gart

Bros.

Hermes

as

the

Landlord

entered

into

an

agreement, not an assignment, but a separate and distinct
agreement to lease directly to Gart Bros the space previously
occupied by Park's, at different rental rates and different
percentage rates; Gart Bros did not assume Park's obligations
as to rents and other required payments, and the parties did
not intend that Gart Bros should assume primary liability for
the rents with secondary liability by Park's.
The obligations of Gart Bros under the Gart Lease
are entirely different from the obligations of Park's under
the Lease Cancellation Agreement

(Tr. p. 60, lines 1-11).

Parks could not, under any stretch of the imagination, become
a

surety

for

any

shortfall

under

the

Lease

Cancellation

Agreement, especially in view of the fact that Park's was the
primary and only obligor under that agreement;

additionally,

there was not any shortfall which could possible accrue under
the Lease Cancellation Agreement.
Furthermore, that type of a defense, the "suretyship
defense"

does

not

apply

to makers

binding

themselves

as

principals; see: First Nat. Bank v. Egbert, 663 P. 2d 85, 8687 (Utah 1983) accord: Utah Farm Production Credit Association
18

v.

Watts,

et

al., 737

P.2d

154

(Utah

Ct. App.,

1987).

One of the most important fact is, the fact that the
contract, i.e., the Lease Cancellation Agreement, upon which
plaintiff's cause of action is predicated, was not at any time
changed, or altered; nor the interpretation by plaintiff was
changed,

in

the

application

of

defendant's

liability

thereunder.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted

that the

alleged "suretyship defense" is not applicable to the facts of
this case, and defendant cannot prevail thereunder,,

It is

important to note that defendant, other than a proffer as to
attorney's fees, in response to the trial court's inquiry, and
the cross-examination of Plaintiff's witnesses, offered no
witnesses of its own to establish its defenses to Plaintiff's
claims before the trial court (Tr. p. 76, lines 15-16).
POINT II
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
In order for Plaintiff to receive the full benefit
of its contract (the Lease Cancellation Agreement), the party
not in default, the Plaintiff, is entitled to an award of
interest to recompense it for money it could have earned if
the breaching party (defendant) had kept its promise, on the
date of breach.

Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court allows

the recovery of prejudgment interest where the "loss is fixed
19

as of a particular time and the amount of the loss can be
calculated with mathematical accuracy".
Clay & Co. ,

See Jorgensen v. John

660 P. 2d 233 (Utah 1983); accord: Bjork v. April

Indus., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977).
The facts in the record clearly show that defendant
breached the contract in April 1988; that the sum of $ 1,000
was due on the first day of each month; that, defendant did
not pay the monthly sum of $ 1,000 after March 1, 1988 (Tr. p.
24,

lines

5-10).

The date of

the

loss suffered

by

the

Plaintiff commenced on April 1, 1988, (finding number 15,
Index p„ 158) and continued thereafter;

and the amount of the

loss, can in fact be calculated with mathematical accuracy,
and, as of the date of the trial, is the sum of $ 22,000.

The

amount of the prejudgment interest can be easily calculated
with mathematical accuracy.
Applying

Utah

law

to

the

facts

of

this

case

Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
DENIED AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
TO EITHER PARTY
Utah follows the

"American Rule" with regard to

awards of attorney's fees. See Note, Attorney's Fees in Utah,
1984 Utah L. Rev. 533, 534. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in not awarding attorney's fees to either party,
and especially the defendant. The findings of the trial court
20

and

its

ruling

found

that

Cancellation Agreement.

defendant

breached

the

Lease

Certainly defendant is not entitled

to attorney's fees when it (defendant) is the non-prevailing
or not successful party.
Defendant's attempt in seeking attorney's fees on
the basis of a Rule 11 (Utah R. Civ. P. ) violation is in
itself violative of Rule 11. Defendant does not point to any
"...

pleading,

plaintiff's

motion

counsel's

or

other

signature,

paper

..." which

which

was

contain

interposed

by

plaintiff's counsel "... for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation."

It is true that plaintiff requested

a trial, so that it can have its day in court, and have a full
hearing on all aspects of the case.
Plaintiff's request for a trial can not be construed
as having been made in bad faith especially in view of the
lack of any evidence in the record.
Furthermore, plaintiff's insistence that Rule 4-501,
Statement

of

the

Administration,

be

Rule,

(3)

observed

(g), Utah
by

the

Code

trial

of

court,

Judicial
(since

defendant's motion for summary judgment was a dispositive
motion), can not be interpreted, either as a violation of Rule
11, (Utah R. Civ. P . ) , or as violative of § 78-27-56, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Plaintiff's counsel's conduct in connection with
21

this matter is, and has been, beyond reproach and consistent
with the ethical obligations which counsel has for his client;
and, consistent with the statutory requirements of conduct;
and, the Rules of Professional Conduct, in effect in the State
of Utah, at the time of the trial.
CONCLUSION
In applying

the

"clearly erroneous

standard"

as

provided by Rule 52(a), (Utah R. Civ. P . ) , in that
"findings of fact ... shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses "
it is respectfully submitted that defendant has failed to
marshal1 the evidence in order to reverse the judgment of the
trial court.

In reviewing the entire record the trial court

did not commit reversible error.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
was correct, after the presentation of all of the evidence, to
grant judgment in favor of plaintiff, Hermes Associates, and
against the defendant Park's Sportsman, and that the amount of
the judgment and the award of pre-judgment interest should be
deemed correct.
This Court should enter its order affirming the
judgment of the trial court.
Additionally, plaintiff should be awarded its costs
and attorney's fees in connection with this appeal and such
22

other and further relief as this Court deems proper in the
premises,
DATED this

%cJtL

day of November, 1990.

Attorney for PlaintiffAppellee
466 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303
Tele: (801) 521-4441

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served four (4) copies of
the foregoing Respondents Brief to:
Mr. Jackson Howard
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
120 East 300 North Street
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
by mailing the same, £irst class mail, postage prepaid, this
of November, 199K
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EXHIBIT "A"
Final Judgment Appealed From

FEB 2 8 13^0

0^

u,

NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696)
Attorney for Plaintiff
466 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303
Tele: (801) 521-4441

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Partnership,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah
Corporation,

Case No. 088-6074
Judge:

Wilkinson

Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial, pursuant
to notice, on the 11th day of January, 1990, before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding without a jury;
Plaintiff Hermes Associates was present by and through J. Rees
Jensen, one of its General Partners, and plaintiff was being
represented by Nick J. Colessides, attorney at law; defendant
Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, was present by Russell
W. Park, its president, and was being represented by Jackson
Howard,

attorney

at law;

the Court having entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

c

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED
that Plaintiff HERMES ASSOCIATES be awarded judgment against
defendant PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah Corporation, in the amount
of:
$ 22,000.00 Principal balance
$ 2,189.92 Accrued interest to date of judgment
$

83.25 Accrued costs to date of judgment

$ 24,273.17

TOTAL JUDGMENT

with interest on the total judgment at 12.0% per annum as
provided by law from the date of this judgment until paid,
plus after accruing costs; and
IT IS HEREBY, FURTHER, ORDERED that Defendant is
entitled to be notified of the volume of the annual gross
sales generated by Gart Bros in the entire 20,820 square foot
leased premises; plaintiff shall notify defendant as soon as
plaintiff obtains the information relating to the volume of
sales from Gart Bros.
IT IS HEREBY, FURTHER, ORDERED that Defendant
should not be required to make payments under the LEASE
CANCELLATION AGREEMENT at such time as Plaintiff receives from
Gart Bros a percentage rental payment

in excess of Ten

thousand

sum

($ 10,000.00) Dollars, which

is calculated

against a gross sales base of One Million Eight Hundred
Thousand ($ 1,800,000.00) Dollars, regardless of what minimum
rent may apply to the Gart Bros Lease before percentage

rentals become applicable thereunder.
DATED this X ^

day of February, 1990,

ZL&5-£^____
HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE:

^O)

JACKSON (flCTWARD

KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to Mr.
Jackson Howard, attorney for defendant} 120 East 300 North
Street, P. O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84&03. postage prepaid,
this yfoQ
day of February, 1990.
/
}f) /
^
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EXHIBIT "B"
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696)
Attorney for Plaintiff
466 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303
Tele: (801) 521-4441

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Partnership,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah
Corporation,

Case No. C-88-6074
Judge:

Wilkinson

Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial, pursuant
to notice, on the 11th day of January,

1990, before the

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding without a jury;
Plaintiff Hermes Associates was present by and through J. Rees
Jensen, one of its General Partners, and plaintiff was being
represented by Nick J. Colessides, attorney at law; defendant
Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, was present by Russell
W. Park, its president, and was being represented by Jackson
Howard,

attorney

at

law;

the

Court

having

adduced

and

received evidence on behalf of all parties, and the Court
having heard argument on behalf of all parties, and the matter

having been submitted to the Court, now upon motion of Nick J.
Colessides, attorney for plaintiff, and good cause otherwise
appearing therefor, the Court makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On or about May 20, 1982, Hermes as Landlord,
and Park's as Tenant, entered into a lease agreement (the
"Park's Lease") affecting certain retail commercial space
located at Hermes1 shopping center, known as the Midvalley
Family Center, at 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County,
Utah.
2.

Defendant Park's entered into possession of

the leased premises and operated its retail sporting goods
store until sometime in April 2nd, 1987.
3. On April 2nd, 1987, Hermes and Park's entered
into a LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT, canceling the Park's
Lease.
4.

The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT obligated

Park's to commence on May 1, 1987, and continue for sixty (60)
months, the payment of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars for
each

and

every

month,

subject

to

the percentage

lease

agreement and gross sales of $ 1,800,000.00 of Gart Bros.
5.

The

LEASE

CANCELLATION

AGREEMENT

became

effective as of the effective date upon which Hermes would
enter (and in fact entered) into a lease agreement with Gart
Bros.
2

6.

As far as the sales volume is concerned the

LEASE TERMINATION AGREEMENT applies to all of the space,
20,820 square feet, leased to Gart Bros*
7.
operative

The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT is the

document

wherein

the

respective

rights

and

obligations of the plaintiff and defendant are clearly set
forth.
8.

The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT is a new

agreement, valid and subsisting in and of itself, and not
dependent upon any other document, except as it relates to
paragraph 4 above.
10.

The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT contained,

inter alia, the following terms:
1. Lease Agreement Cancellation. The Commercial
and Industrial Lease Agreement of May 20, 1982, and all
subsequent addendums or modifications are incorporated herein
by reference. The said Lease Agreement and all addendums and
modifications are hereby declared canceled effective as of the
date on which a Lease Agreement between Hermes and Gart
Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., becomes effective.
2.
Consideration.
In consideration of the
cancellation of said Agreement, Park's does by this instant
agree to pay Hermes the sum of One Thousand Dollars
($1,000.00) per month for a term of sixty (60) months
commencing on the 1st day of May, 1987, and continuing
thereafter until sixty (60) installments have been paid or
unless the said obligation is terminated or canceled by reason
of the operation of Provision 3 following.
3. Termination and Rebate. Hermes acknowledges
that effective on the date that Hermes enters into a Lease
Agreement with Gart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., for the
lease rights of Park's to the premises located at
approximately 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah,
that
this Lease Cancellation Agreement will become
3

CGiS*

contemporaneously effective.
When and if Gart Brothers
Sporting Goods, Inc., make a percentage rent payment to Hermes
in any twelve (12) month period of a sum in excess of Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the subject demised
premises, Hermes will cancel the payment requirements of
Provision 2 above and thereafter Park's will have no
obligation to make further installment payments, provided that
all installment payments previously due and payable to Hermes
have been paid. It is further provided that at such time as
Hermes receives the first said percentage rental payment in
excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) from Gart Brothers
Sporting Goods, Inc., Hermes will refund to Park's up to
Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) in accordance to the
amount due and paid by Park's during the -twelve (12) months
for which said percentage rent was paid to Hermes by Gart
Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc.
11.

The effective date of a lease between Hermes

and Gart Bros, (the "Gart Lease") was the 7th day of April,
1987.
12.

The terms of the Parks Sportsman's Lease,

dated May 20, 1982, were not taken over by Gart Bros.
13.

The obligation of Park's to pay the $

1,000.00 per month was to continue until Gart Bros made to
Hermes a percentage rent payment in any twelve (12) month
period of a sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00)
Dollars, under the Gart Lease.
14.

Park's

commenced

the

monthly

payments

pursuant to the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT and made eleven
(11) payments thereunder amounting to the sum of $ 11,000.00.
15. Park's did not pay the monthly payment due on
April 1, 1988, and made no other payments thereafter.
16.

As of the date of the trial Park's has not
4

made twenty two (22) required monthly payments, amounting to
the sum of Twenty Two Thousand ($ 22,000.00) Dollars.
17.

It was not intended by Hermes that Park's be

excused from performance (i.e., the payment of $ 1,000.00 per
month) on April 2, or on October 1, 1987, or January 1, 1988,
or April 1, 1988, except for the provisions of paragraphs 2
and 3 of the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT.
18. The Court finds that any subsequent (to April
2, 1987) agreement(s) between Hermes and Gart Bros is not and
it is not deemed to be a novation of the LEASE CANCELLATION
AGREEMENT.
19. The Court finds that Park's was not a surety
nor a guarantor of the Gart Bros Lease, or any of the
obligations thereunder.
20.

The Court finds that Gart Bros would not

assume the obligations of Park's under the Park's Lease, nor
under the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT.
22. During the first year, ending on December 31,
1987, or the second year ending on December 31, 1988, or the
third year ending on December 31, 1989, of the Gart Bros
Lease, Gart Bros did not achieve gross sales in sufficient
amounts

so

as to obligate Gart Bros to pay

to Hermes

percentage rents in excess of $ 10,000.00.
23.

Gart Bros did not make a percentage rent

payment to Hermes Associates, in any twelve month period, of
5

a sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars for the
total space 20,820 square feet) leased to Gart Bros.
24.

Plaintiff is entitled to receive and does

receive from Gart Bros the information regarding Gart bros
sales

in

the

leased

premises.

It

is

Plaintiff's

responsibility that Plaintiff should provide the information
so received to the Defendant, as soon as possible after
receiving it from Gart Bros.
25.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

prejudgment

interest, at the rate of 10% per annum, amounting to the total
sum of $ 1,990.93 as of the date of the trial, together with
an accrued daily interest at the prejudgment rate of $ 6.03
for each day from January 11th, 1990, until the date of the
entry of the judgment, and thereafter at the rate of 12% per
annum.
26.

Neither party is entitled to an award of

attorney's fees.
27.

Plaintiff

is entitled

to its costs in

connection with this action.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now
enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the

principal sum of $ 22,000.00; plus
2.

Pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per
6

G0J

annum from the date that each monthly installment was due to
the date of the entry of the judgment, which sum is $1,990.93
as of January 11th, 1990, plus such additional sum equal to
the rate of $ 6.03 per day until the date of the entry of the
judgment, and thereafter interest at the rate of 12% per
annum.
3. Plaintiff is entitled to its costs of suit the
same to be submitted by affidavit to the court by plaintiff's
counsel.
4.

Neither party is entitled to an award of

attorney's fees.
5.

Defendant is entitled to be notified of the

volume of the annual gross sales generated by Gart Bros in the
entire 20,820 square foot leased premises; plaintiff shall
notify defendant as soon as plaintiff obtains the information
relating to the volume of sales from Gart Bros.
6.

Defendant should not be required to make

payments under the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT at such time
as Plaintiff receives from Gart Bros a percentage rental
payment in excess of Ten thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars, which
sum is calculated against a gross sales base of One Million
Eight Hundred Thousand ($ 1,800,000.00) Dollars, regardless of
what

minimum

rent

may

apply

to

the

Gart

Lease

percentage rentals become applicable thereunder.

7

before

DATED this

}*-

day of February, 1990.

/
/

HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE:

UZ^ HOWARD^
JACKSON
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD
Attorneys for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to Mr. Jackson Howard, attorney for
defendant, 120 East 300 North Street, P. O. Box 778, Provo,
Utah 84603, postage prepaid, this

day of February,

1990.

HAPARK.ll
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EXHIBIT "C"
Lease of Cancellation Agreement

LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT

THIS ACREEMENT etede and entered Into this 2nd day of April, 1987, by
and between Harass Associates, a Utah partnerehip, hereinafter called "Hermes"
and Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, hereinafter called " P a r k V and
WHEREAS, Hermes and Park's have entered into a Commercial and Industrial
Least under an Agreement dated Hay 20, 1982, and
WHEREAS, it la the intent and purpose of the parties to this Agreement
to cancel aaid Lease Agreement conditioned upon certain terms and conditional
herein stated,
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants of aach of
Che parties hereto
IT IS ACREED:
1. Lease Agreement Cancellation. The Commercial and Induatrial
Lease Agreement of Kay 20, 1962, and all aubaequent addendume or modifications
are Incorporated herein by reference. The aaid Leaae Agreement and all addtndums
and modifications are hereby declared cancelled affective aa of the date on which
a Least Agreement between Hermes and Cart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc. becomes
effective.
2. Consideration. In consideration of the cancellation of said
Agreement. Park's does by this Instant agree to pay Hermes the eum of One Thousand
Dollars (51.000.00) per month for a term of aixty (60) months commencing on the
1st day ul Hay, 1987, and continuing thereofter until aixty (60) Installments
have been paid or unleas the aaid obligation la terminated or cancelled by
reason of the operation of Provlaion 3 following.
3. Termination and Rebate. Hermes acknowledges that affective on
the date that Hermes antera into a Leeee Agreement with Cart Brothera Sporting
Coode, Inc. for the leaae rlghta of Park's to the premises located at approximately 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Laka City, Utah that this Leaae Cancellation
Agreement will become contemporaneously affective. When and if Cart Brothers
Sporting Goods, Inc. make a percentage rent payment to Hermes in any twelve (12)
month period of a eua in excess of Tan Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the
aubject demised prealees, Hermes will cancel the payment requirements of
Provision 2 above and thereafter Park's will have no obligation to make further
installment payments, provided that all installment payments previously due end
payable to Hermes have been paid. It la further provided that at auch time ss
Hermes receives the first aaid percentage rental payment in excess of Ten
Thoueand Dollars ($10,000.00) from Cart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., Hereel
will refund to Park's up to Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) in accordance
to the amount due and paid by Park's during the twelve (12) months for which
aaid percentage rent waa paid to Hermes by Cart Brothers Sporting Coods, Inc.
4. Sstlsfsctlon of Promissory Note. Upon receipt by Hermes of the
•urn of One Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($130,000.00) from Cart Brothera
Sporting Goods, Inc. (due and payable en or before Kay 1, 1967) aa reimbursement for the total sum of One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($148,500.00) paid by Hermes to Park's for tenant leasehold Improvements in the
aubject demised premises, Hermes aha11 return to Park'e that certain promiaaory
note dated August 1, 1986 covering aaid aum marked MPaid in Full."

PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah corporation

HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah partnership

BY
•

Aandy'R. Park
Preeident

:'-"••< -*-<*/•

ATTEST: Secretary

"")

f'/a^A

/ / / . tees Jen{X
1 / Senior CetieAl Partner

